However the trade figures are misleading

Five years after the disappearance of national currencies, the two leading candidates in the French presidential election jointly criticized the too high level of the euro, without seeing that it is the result of the strict application of rules laid down by the Maastricht Treaty. If require a revision of this Treaty, their criticisms seem purely electoral. In the opposite direction, defenders of the expensive euro are the same simplistic in their arguments. Try to objectively to the balance sheet of the monetary policy pursued by the European Central Bank.

The assets of this policy must recognize that a cheaper currency has three advantages. First, it reduces the prices, converted into euros, to all imports from outside the area. Such a phenomenon, which contributes to fight against inflation, is beneficial to consumers, but many more large distribution to collect a high margin of marketing. Secondly, the acquisition of companies outside the euro area is made ipso facto less costly for globalised companies. Finally, long-term interest rates are lowered by the prospect of the euro continued to appreciate, according to the principle of parity of interest rates (on the horizon of a decade, is expected today a course of 1.43 dollar for 1 euro).

On the liabilities side, the changeover to the euro is first removed all usual benchmarks prices in national currency; allowing an insidious increase in domestic prices, it compensates for the anti-inflationary effect on imports. Then, an expensive euro penalizes the competitiveness of foreign trade volume, i.e. at constant prices. It hinders exports and faster imports on all exchanges outside the euro area, i.e. for 46 of our foreign trade.

However, the trade figures are misleading. Unlike the France, the German trade balance appears to be in good health, with strengths that does not have our country: near stagnation past three consumption, quality of adaptation to global demand. In important intermediates at low cost, German companies raise their value added, taking advantage of their market and their reputation power. But, in return, employment in Germany is the loser.

Because, in reality, the most serious disadvantage of the expensive euro is the decrease in attractiveness. By raising relative wages to other countries, that is by making it too costly work, it is less favourable throughout the euro area, that the companies are local or external. Not only domestic productive investment is disabled, but it is oriented towards productivity gains, without expansion of production capacity on-site. The immediate employment decreases, and domestic demand further slowed that wages tend to be compressed. Eventually, the offer is victimized, which penalizes the growth potential. Globalized businesses, they relocate their production to more attractive areas, either by the investment, directly or indirectly through partnership agreements.

This movement is General for all of the euro zone, extending the deleterious effects which had previously given the shackling of various currencies to the deutsche Mark. This is the reason for which the dominant companies thriving health does not automatically good economic health on the national territory. The domestic economy of the Germany is sick, such as those of most of the countries of the euro area. Unemployment is high, and its recent recession reflects mainly the fact that demography is even more catastrophic than in France. Unlike an idea which is still widespread, is not on trade that is felt by the main impact of a cheaper currency. Except at the outset, where it was cheaper, the euro has created structural anemia of domestic product gross. The persistence of mass unemployment is the direct consequence.

In these conditions, it is more relevant to traditional patterns: neither the cleavage between "bourgeois" and "proletarians", nor the division between a "circle of reason" and the extremists (imagined by Alain Minc), or the distinction between the pro and the anti-Europeans Marxist (80 of our fellow citizens are favourable to the principle of Europe), or left-right ideological differences (temporarily become secondary). By illustrating the objections of interest within the social body, only the balance of the expensive euro helps to understand the result of May 29, 2005.

Not have been accidental, this referendum has updated the great essential rivalry between two opposing camps: on the one hand, the recipients of the expensive euro and wild liberalization, natural supporters of the "Yes" (primarily large enterprises and the globalized elites, the old and pensioners); on the other, the victims collected logically on the "no" (the great mass employees, small patterns, young people and the unemployed). Appeared on this occasion, this new line of cleavage will prevail in the future.